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Since the early 1990s, West German ﬁrms have had to deal with sharp
changes of the economic environment. The German Uniﬁcation and the
emerging competitors in Eastern European countries seem to be the most
important ones. At the same time, some labor market institutions in Ger-
many became less rigid—for example, regulation on temporary work. But
other institutions are unchanged, so that by and large Germany remains a
country with highly regulated labor markets. Thus, international literature
characterizes the German economy as a coordinated one (for example,
Hall and Soskice 2003). Our study gives an overview of the West German
wage structure (their dynamics) and of the mobility in ﬁrms of the West
German private sector during the 1990s and sheds light on the role of labor
market institutions in Germany.
The following are the main questions of our analyses: How much of the
German wage dispersion can be attributed to ﬁrm and worker characteris-
tics? Are there diﬀerences if ﬁrms are confronted with diﬀerent institutions?
We address especially the system of collective agreements and the ap-
prenticeship training system. The role of collective agreement in setting
wages is seen in Germany as very strong, especially in combination with
works councils, because it links the aims of unions—normally formulated
on the branch level and negotiated in collective contracts—directly to single
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(OECD) states that the German wage-bargaining system is centralized on
a medium level (the single Federal States of Germany, Bundesländer) and
coordinated on a high level (OECD 1997). According to Calmfors and
Driﬃll (1988), this system leads to suboptimal labor market performance
because wages do not react suﬃciently to macroeconomic shocks.
To examine this point, we will compare separately for diﬀerent years
wages and turnover of ﬁrms covered by collective contracts with ﬁrms not
covered by collective contracts, using propensity score matching. We found
that the diﬀerence of wages and turnover between ﬁrms with and without
collective contracts alternates sharply during the business cycle. For ex-
ample, the workers’ wage changes during a boom in ﬁrms without collec-
tive contracts are higher than in ﬁrms with collective contracts, whereas
during a recession, they are lower, suggesting that ﬁrms without collective
contracts can react more ﬂexibly to macroeconomic shocks.
The second property of German labor market institutions we address is
the system of vocational training. This system certiﬁes a large range of oc-
cupations. For ﬁrms covered by collective agreements, the wages are nego-
tiated speciﬁcally for occupational groups. Furthermore, if the occupa-
tional structure of a national workforce reﬂects the scale of worker
productivity, then there might be reasons for ﬁrms to set wages according
to occupations. It may be, therefore, expected that wages and wage changes
are tied to occupations.
To dig deeper into the role of occupations for wage diﬀerences, we ask
the following: Can occupational wage diﬀerences be explained by diﬀer-
ences in observed or unobserved characteristics of ﬁrms that employ work-
ers within certain occupations? Or can they be explained by diﬀerences in
unobserved characteristics of the workers? To answer these questions, we
use the method of Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999). We ﬁnd that a
large part of the occupational wage diﬀerences can be explained by unob-
served personal characteristics. This means workers with good unobserved
characteristics are sorted into high-wage occupations.
With rapidly growing technological and organizational change, we as-
sume that the instrument of setting wages by rather rigid deﬁned occupa-
tions loses its power in predicting or signaling single worker productiv-
ity. Therefore, we examine the development of the role of occupations in
wage setting by analysis of variance technique. The results support our as-
sumption.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, we describe the
macroeconomic environment for German ﬁrms in the 1990s and refer
more deeply to labor market institutions that are aﬀecting the wage and
mobility patterns. The data are described in section 8.3. In section 8.4, we
discuss the empirical results. Section 8.5 summarizes and concludes the
chapter.
262 Holger Alda, Lutz Bellmann, and Hermann Gartner8.2 Macroeconomic Environment and 
Labor Market Institutions in Germany
8.2.1 Macroeconomic Environment in the 1990s
For a ﬁrst glance, the macroeconomic situation is described in table 8.1
by the development of the West German gross domestic product (GDP)
and the respective unemployment rates during the 1990s.
In the ﬁrst years after the German Uniﬁcation, the West German econ-
omy beneﬁted from the growing demand for goods and services in the for-
mer German Democratic Republic. The West German GDP grew sub-
stantially from 1990 to 1992, but not enough to lower or at least stabilize the
unemployment rate. Then, in 1993 there was a slump in economic activities.
In 1994 and 1995, the GDP grew again slightly. Since 1998, the growth of
the GDP is joined with a decrease of the unemployment rate. The peak of
the GDP growth rate was reached in 2000 with about 3 percent. In order to
map a business cycle, we choose for our empirical study the years 1993,
1995, and 2000; 1993 is a slump year, 2000 a boom year. In 1995, the growth
rate is average, and the unemployment rate remains almost stable.
8.2.2 Labor Market Institutions in Germany
On the OECD scale of rigidities and employment protection, Germany
ranks in the midﬁeld (OECD 1999). Despite the trend of deregulating the
German labor market in the 1990s, there are still several institutions that
enforce the position of insiders. Outsiders have, especially during reces-
sionary periods, only small chances to enter or reenter the (internal) labor
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Table 8.1 GDP and unemployment rate in West Germany (1991–2000)
Year GDP Growth GDP 1 year (%) Unemployment rate
1991 1,567,693 .063
1992 1,594,951 1.74 .066
1993 1,557,562 –2.34 .082
1994 1,578,491 1.34 .092
1995 1,600,479 1.39 .093
1996 1,607,803 0.46 .101
1997 1,629,703 1.36 .110
1998 1,664,769 2.15 .094
1999 1,697,689 1.98 .088
2000 1,749,554 3.06 .078
Sources: For GDP, German Central Statistical Oﬃce. For unemployment rate, Federal Em-
ployment Service.
Note: Gross domestic product (GDP) is at 1995 prices in millions of euros (West Germany
only).market. Four of the most important institutions in Germany aﬀecting
wage setting and worker mobility are the system of vocational training,
works councils, collective wage contracts, and the protection of workers
against dismissal.
The System of Vocational Training
The German system of vocational education is called a dual system be-
cause the apprentice is trained partly in the ﬁrm and partly in a vocational
school. The system has developed from preindustrial apprenticeship roots
and prevails not only in Germany, but similarly in Austria, Denmark, and
Switzerland (compare with Winkelmann 1997). The training continues be-
tween two and three and a half years, so ﬁrms invest remarkable time and
money in the training of apprentices. The German vocational system re-
duces the mobility of employees, especially in the group of young, skilled
blue-collar workers in the ﬁrst years after ﬁnishing their training, because
establishments try to amortize their investment in human capital by longer
job tenure of their trainees (Schwerdt and Bender 2003). In several
branches, collective agreements guarantee that apprentices can stay for at
least one year in the ﬁrm after the training.
The German apprenticeship system has deep impacts on the skill com-
position of the workforce, on tenure tracks, and, consequently, on the wage
setting and wage changes of employees. The apprenticeship system and the
resulting occupational composition of the workforce is responsible for a
clear distinction between skilled and unskilled workers. The occupational
characteristics are institutionalized by certiﬁcates and occupation regula-
tions—especially in manufacturing and trades, but also in the private and
public sector.1
In general, the German workforce can be roughly divided into low-,
medium-, and high-skilled workers (unskilled, skilled, and workers with a
university degree). The apprenticeship system and the resulting occupa-
tional structure are mainly a matter of medium skills. In section 8.4, we es-
timate for all three skill levels of manufacturing, private and public service
occupations, the average wage return rate using diﬀerent sets of covariates,
and worker and ﬁrm characteristics, respectively. Furthermore, we decom-
pose the variance of workers’ average wage change according to ﬁrm and
occupation.
Works Councils
Another notable institution is the setup of works councils. They have a
strong legal base in Germany. A works council is guaranteed by law in all
ﬁrms with more than ﬁve employees, if the majority of the ﬁrms’ employ-
264 Holger Alda, Lutz Bellmann, and Hermann Gartner
1. An occupational scheme with fewer distinctions also exists for unskilled workers, but this
is often only regulated in collective contracts.ees want to elect one. Furthermore, in ﬁrms with more than twenty em-
ployees, the works council must agree to dismissals. In case of mass dis-
missals, the regional labor oﬃce and the ﬁrms have to draft a social plan to
avoid cases of social hardships, if possible. Lots of studies have been made
about the eﬀect of works councils on wages and mobility of employees
(e.g., Addison et al. [2004]). Nearly all studies conclude that the mobility
of workers is hampered by this institution.
Collective Wage Contracts
Especially in larger ﬁrms, works councils often coincide with collective
agreements. Table 8.2 shows the proportions of full-time workers covered
by collective agreements on the ﬁrm or branch level2 and shows for the
years 1998 and 2002 how many of these covered full-time workers are
working in a ﬁrm with a works council.3
The coverage of works councils and collective agreement on full-time
workers in larger ﬁrms is above 90 percent. Firms that are members in an
employers’ association can deviate from paying collectively agreed wages
only by negotiating with the workers on the ﬁrm level, but nevertheless, the
branch union must agree to the result of the bargaining. Firms that are not
members in an employers’ association have no restrictions in setting wages.
Statutory minimum wages exist only in the construction sector. Negotiated
wages must be paid only for union members, but, in fact, negotiated wages
are paid to all employees in a ﬁrm. The coverage of collective agreement is
higher in manufacturing than in the private service sector. Also, the in-
crease of bargained wage is often higher in manufacturing. A high-level co-
ordinated bargaining needs some kind of standards to deal with ﬁrm and
regional heterogeneities in the branches. This could be occupations, for in-
stance.
Some ﬁrms pay more than negotiated wages, especially for high-wage
jobs. This additional payment is a component of ﬂexibility in wage setting
in rigid labor markets (Kohaut and Schnabel 2003).4 In this perspective,
paying higher wages than ﬁxed by collective agreements will cause larger
wage dispersions withinﬁrms. On the other hand, for example, Büttner and
Fitzenberger (1998) show that wages are equal to collective arrangements,
especially at the bottom of the wage distribution. If both are present in a
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2. Approximately 10 percent of all private ﬁrms have wage arrangements on the ﬁrm level.
The share is rising. For table 8.2, we group both outward forms of collective agreement into
one category.
3. In 1993 and 1995, the information is not available. We choose the years 1998 and 2002 
in order to show that the coverage of collective agreement over full-time workers is still de-
creasing.
4. Another form of additional ﬂexibility in paying workers could be employee participation
in asset formation or share ownership. In the year 1998, 5 percent of all West German ﬁrms
use this form of payment (Möller 2001) covering about 15 percent of the total West German
workforce.speciﬁc ﬁrm, we may ﬁnd no diﬀerence in the within-wage dispersion be-
cause in unionized ﬁrms, the whole within-wage dispersion might be
shifted to the right.
As table 8.3 shows, the proportion of ﬁrms paying more than ﬁxed by
collective agreement decreases between 1993 and 2000 by 14 percentage
points. These ﬁrms pay in 1993, on average, 13.4 percent more than bar-
gained; in 2000, they pay 11.5 percent more.
In section 8.4 we will test by nonparametric propensity score matching,
whether unionized and nonunionized ﬁrms diﬀer in their average wage
level, their wage change, the within-ﬁrm wage dispersion, and in their mo-
bility patterns (entry and exit rates, percentage of core workers).
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Table 8.2 Works councils and collective agreement: Coverage on full-time
employees in the West German private sector
Coverage of  Coverage of collective agreement 
collective agreement and works councilsa
Class size of employees 1998 2002 1998 2002
1–4 .46 .45 Not possible Not possible
5–19 .65 .55 .05 .05
20–99 .73 .62 .24 .29
100–199 .79 .72 .60 .61
200–499 .85 .81 .79 .76
500  .96 .94 .95 .92
Total .78 .71 .51 .48
Source: IAB-Establishment-Panel 1998 and 2002, weighted values.
a100 percent are the proportions of the rows on the left.
Table 8.3 Proportion of ﬁrms paying more than collectively agreed wages, average,
and distribution of this payment (in percent above tariﬀ wage) on ﬁrm
level (proportion: ﬁrms covered by collective agreement in the West
German private sector)
Standard 10th  90th
Year Proportion Mean deviation percentile percentile
1993 .41 .134 .076 .05 .25
1995 .32 .112 .073 .05 .20
1998 .23 .111 .066 .05 .20
2000 .27 .115 .071 .05 .20
Source: IAB Establishment Panel 1993–2000, weighted values.
Notes: Reading example: In the year 2000, 27 percent of all German unionized ﬁrms pay at
least to some of their workers higher wages than collectively bargained. On average, this ad-
ditional payment is 11.5 percent higher than ﬁxed by the respective collective contract. The
standard deviation is about 7 percent. The 10th percentile of these ﬁrms are paying 5 percent
higher wages than ﬁxed by collective agreement, the 90th percentile is 20 percent.The Protection of Workers against Dismissal
A prominent example for the protection of insiders is the German Pro-
tection Against Dismissal Acts (PADA), which applies for all ﬁrms with
more than ﬁve (between 1996 and 1998 and since 2004 for ﬁrms with more
than ten) employees. In the ﬁeld of application of the PADA, ﬁrms are
obliged to take into account for their dismissals fairness considerations to
avoid cases of social hardship. As a result, if an employer wants to dismiss
employees, it has to select young employees (workers with short job tenure)
instead of others, especially older, married workers and employees with
children. In all of the ﬁrms included in the analysis, this law is valid. Thus,
we can expect that the mobility of individuals is mainly determined by
younger persons with shorter job durations (for an investigation of worker
ﬂows and dismissal protection, see Bauer, Bender, and Bonin [2004] and
Verick [2004]).5
Other Institutions
In Germany, there is a large wedge between labor costs and net wages.
Because of the cost of German Uniﬁcation, the wedge increased during the
1990s: According to the OECD (2005), the income tax plus employee and
employer contributions for social security for a single person without chil-
dren increased in Germany from 46.4 in 1993 to 51.8 in 2000 (as percentage
of labor costs). This may be the main reason that, despite a moderate de-
velopment of wages, unemployment did not fall during the 1990s.
A further institution aﬀecting unemployment and wages is unemploy-
ment beneﬁts. Compared to OECD countries, the replacement ratio
ranges in the midﬁeld in the 1990s, but the duration of beneﬁts was very
high. With a suﬃcient work history, older unemployed workers are entitled
to unemployment beneﬁts for up to thirty-two months. The strictness of
work availability conditions are criticized as lax. The duration of beneﬁt
entitlement and the criteria for beneﬁt receipt was thoroughly reformed
only after 2000.
Some other institutions of the German labor market are deregulated al-
ready in the middle of the 1990s: the Federal Employment Service loses the
exclusive right of placing workers in jobs. Restrictions for temporary work
agencies are relaxed, and it becomes easier for ﬁrms to employ workers by
ﬁxed-term contracts—resulting in a increasing proportion of ﬁxed-term
workers (compare with table 8.4 in section 8.3). We expect, therefore, that
a rising part of wage dynamics during the 1990s could be explained by the
mobility of workers instead of the adjustment of wages for stayers.
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5. Both studies found no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the level of employment between ﬁrms in
which the PADA is valid and in which it is not. But there are diﬀerences in the structure of em-
ployment.8.3 Data Section
We use the German linked employer-employee data of the Institute for
Employment Research (LIAB), the LIAB data link ﬁrm-level data from
the IAB Establishment Panel (a survey), to administrative individual data
from the employment statistics register.6
The employment statistics register is based on the integrated notiﬁca-
tion procedure for the health, pension, and unemployment insurances,
which was introduced in 1975. Employers are obliged to report informa-
tion about all employees covered by social security to the social security
agencies. They submit the notiﬁcations at the beginning and the end of
any employment period as well as each year on December 31st. The noti-
ﬁcations include the date of employees’ entry and exit, wages, gender,
qualiﬁcation, and the current occupation (deﬁned by a three-digit code).
There are legal sanctions for misreporting. The employment statistics reg-
ister covers more than 90 percent of all employees in manufacturing and
75 percent in the service sector. Freelancers, civil servants, self-employed
persons, and workers with earnings below a minimum level are not eligi-
ble for the social security system and, therefore, are not included in the
worker-level data.
The IAB Establishment Panel is a survey conducted since 1993. The unit
“Establishment” refers not to an enterprise or company as a commercial
aggregate, meaning that we are not able to identify multiplant ﬁrms in our
data.7 Our observation unit ﬁrm is smaller than in linked employer-
employee data from many other countries. The IAB Establishment Panel
is a sample drawn from the so-deﬁned establishments included in the em-
ployment statistics register according to stratiﬁcation cells of the estab-
lishment size class (ten categories) and the industry (sixteen categories).8
These stratiﬁcation cells are also used for weighting the data set. The pop-
ulation for the survey are all ﬁrms with at least one employee covered by
the social security system.
To correct for panel attrition, exit of ﬁrms, and newly founded units, the
samples are augmented regularly, leading to an unbalanced panel. The at-
trition of the largest ﬁrms can only be corrected by an increasing number
of medium-sized ﬁrms. The reason for this is not only the absence of ap-
propriate larger ﬁrms. Especially due to outsourcing activities during the
1990s, the average ﬁrm size in Germany was decreasing.
The IAB establishment oversamples larger ﬁrms, meaning that there is al-
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6. Appendix A gives a short description of the two data sets that are linked to the LIAB.
7. In this sense, we make hereafter no diﬀerence between the terms ﬁrm, establishment, and
employer.
8. From 2000 onward, the stratiﬁcation is done according to twenty industries.ways a diﬀerence between weighted and unweighted results.9 To illustrate
the eﬀect of the weighting procedure for the ﬁrm-level data, table 8.4 shows
the weighted and unweighted values of the proportion of part-time workers
and ﬁxed-term contracts. Smaller establishments are sampled with a lower
probability so that weighting increases their proportion. The weighted val-
ues for the proportions of both employment forms are higher because small
ﬁrms employ a higher share of part-time and ﬁxed-term contract workers.
A short note to the result: the increase in the share of part-time workers
is mostly driven by the rising participation rate of females in the labor mar-
ket, whereas ﬁxed-term contracts are distributed more equally between
males and females. However, both forms of employment are characterized
in the literature as one instrument of ﬁrms in order to gain more employ-
ment ﬂexibility. Due to the increasing proportions of both forms of em-
ployment, we expect higher mobility on ﬁrm level at the end of our obser-
vation period.
The LIAB data are constructed by merging the IAB Establishment Panel
with the data of the employment statistics register using an administrative
ﬁrm identiﬁer. The IAB has developed two types of the LIAB: the cross-
section model and the longitudinal model. An overview about the LIAB,
the two data models, and the several versions is given by Alda, Bender, and
Gartner (2005); further details are described in Data Reports (Alda
2005a,b,c,d). We compute the descriptive statistics with the LIAB cross-
sectional model, version 1. This data set includes in each year the employ-
ment spells of the persons employed at June 30th in a ﬁrm surveyed by the
IAB Establishment Panel.10
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9. As a rule of thumb, a small establishment with, say, less than ﬁve workers, represents ap-
proximately 3,000 ﬁrms of the national economy, while the largest ones, say, with more than
1,000 employees, represents, on average, only 1.2 ﬁrms.
10. June 30th is the reference date of the questions in the IAB Establishment Panel.
Table 8.4 Weighted and unweighted proportions of selected forms of employment
on ﬁrm level (population: ﬁrms with at least 25 full-time employees)
Proportion of:
Part-time workers Fixed-term contracts
Year Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
1993 .09 .13 .02 .03
1995 .17 .22 n.a. n.a.
2000 .20 .28 .08 0.9
Source: IAB Establishment Panel 1993, 1995, 2000.
Note: n.a.   not applicable.The construction of the cross-sectional LIAB allows us to identify
movers and stayers as well as compute job duration and the change in
wages only by identifying the workers in the same ﬁrm on June 30th in two
sequenced years.11We constructed the tenure variable by checking whether
an employee in year t appears also in the same ﬁrm in t – n (n ∈ 1,2, . . .).
With larger n, we observe fewer ﬁrms due to panel ﬂuctuation. Therefore,
we diﬀerentiate only between workers with tenure of more or less than
three years. Furthermore, in the cross-sectional LIAB, we cannot observe
employees after leaving a surveyed ﬁrm. It follows that we are not able to
compute the change in wages for workers who change their employer with
this data model.12
The ﬁrm size is constructed by aggregating the number of workers cov-
ered by the social security system in the employment statistics register. We
include in the analysis only ﬁrms with at least twenty-ﬁve employees in t,
where part-time workers, apprentices, and workers not covered by the so-
cial insurance system do not count.
Results from tables 8.6, 8.7, 8.8, and 8.10 are computed with the LIAB
longitudinal model, version 1. The longitudinal model, version 1, is based
on all surveyed ﬁrms interviewed between 1999 and 2001 in each year. The
corresponding employee data contain all persons who work at least one
day between 1996 and 2001 in these ﬁrms. The complete working histories
of these persons are applicable for the time period 1990 to 2001.
Although both samples—the LIAB cross-sectional and longitudinal
model—are representative of the German economy, they diﬀer in some
technical aspects and the time period covered. While we restrict the cross-
sectional data to ﬁrms in the private sector with at least twenty-ﬁve full-
time employees, the analyses based on the LIAB longitudinal model covers
all ﬁrms, including the public sector, with at least three full-time employ-
ees.13 Consequently, the results for the average wage and other statistics
diﬀer slightly between the two data models. All key variables and deﬁni-
tions (appendix B) are—if applicable—the same in both data models.
However, independent of the LIAB model, two problems occur in the
administrative employee data:
First, all wages in the employment register are left-truncated and right-
censored. The observable gross wages are left-truncated because workers
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11. This means ﬁrst, identify ﬁrms, which are in the t and t – 1 part of the panel. Second,
identify the employees, who are observed in t and t – 1. They are deﬁned as stayers. Third,
identify workers with only one observation. Workers only observed in t are entries; workers
only observed in t– 1 are exits. For the ﬁrst year of the panel, 1993, we use another procedure.
For this year, we calculate entries, exits, and wage changes by drawing additional information
from the employment register that are not included in the cross-sectional LIAB. This is also
the reason why we have the highest number of observations in 1993.
12. With the exception of employees moving to another surveyed ﬁrm, the number of these
movers is too small for calculating the change in wages for persons changing their employer.
13. The private sector is identiﬁed via the legal form of the surveyed ﬁrms.with wages below a certain limit are not obliged to pay contributions for
social security. More important is that the wages are also right-censored
because the contribution to the social security system must only be paid up
to a contribution limit, meaning that this threshold is the highest observ-
able wage in the respective year. The contribution limit rises from year to
year. For example, in the year 2000, it corresponds to a gross monthly wage
of 3,427 euros. Between 8 and 15 percent of all observations of a year are
censored. In the group of employees with a university degree, 50 percent of
their wages are censored.
The right-censoring of the wage has implications on the distribution of
wages and, therefore, for our wage statistics. To correct this, we impute the
censored wages using a tobit estimation of a Mincerian earnings function
augmented by ten sector and ten occupation dummies. The imputed wage
is calculated as the expected wage (x  ) plus an error term drawn from a
truncated normal distribution.14
The second problem is the employment statistics diﬀer only between
full- and part-time workers, without further information about working
hours. Therefore, part-time workers and switchers from part-time to full-
time (and opposite) are excluded from our analyses.
We also exclude apprentices from our data set.15All descriptive wage sta-
tistics for the cross-country comparison are based on continuing workers
in continuing ﬁrms. Appendix B gives an overview for all the key variables
(and their deﬁnitions) we apply in this chapter.
8.4 Empirical Findings
We present each descriptive table of wage levels, wage changes, and the
mobility patterns for the cross-country comparison twice, with weighted
and unweighted values. They are printed in appendix C. We focus least on
the wage statistics of the unweighted results because they are more precise.
The weighted values give an impression of how the oversampling of larger
ﬁrms in the IAB Establishment aﬀects the results. All ﬁgures and tables
show monthly gross wages in euros. We deﬂated the wages with the oﬃcial
consumer price index with the base year 2000.
Additionally, to describe statistics on wage structure, we use an analysis
of variance (ANOVA) technique. We ask especially how much of the vari-
ance of wages can be explained by ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects and by human capital
and how much of the variance of wage changes can be explained by ﬁrm
eﬀects and by occupational group.
We analyze the role of occupational group in wage setting more deeply
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14. The method is described in Gartner (2005).
15. Apprentices work full time and receive wages ﬁxed by collective agreements. Their
wages are much lower even than those of unskilled blue-collar workers.by applying a similar method as developed by Abowd, Kramarz, and Mar-
golis (1999) and applied by Andrews, Schank, and Upward (2004). The
method allows us to diﬀer between occupational eﬀects, observed and un-
observed ﬁrm eﬀects, and observed and unobserved person eﬀects.
A further topic we address more deeply is the eﬀect of collective agree-
ments on wages and worker mobility. To identify this eﬀect, we apply a
nonparametric kernel matching algorithm and bootstrap standard errors
of the treatment eﬀect with 200 repetitions. Our sample contains 120 ﬁrms
without collective agreements in 1993 (91 in 1995 and 193 in 2000). The pro-
bit estimation of the propensity scores uses as covariates the average age of
workers in a ﬁrm; a dummy for workers council; one regional dummy; and
proportions of females, of ﬁxed-term workers (not included in 1995), of
blue-collar workers, and of six diﬀerent qualiﬁcation groups. The results
are listed in appendix table 8F.1 and discussed in the following subsections.
Before discussing wage and mobility patterns at the ﬁrm level, we should
take a glance at demographical ﬁrm patterns: table 8.5 shows the number
of West German ﬁrms, their average size, and the employment growth on
ﬁrm level. During the 1990s, the number of ﬁrms is increasing. At the same
time, the ﬁrm size decreases. The negative growth of employment on ﬁrm
level refers only partly to a negative macroeconomic growth of employ-
ment, because the negative employment growth on ﬁrm level is partly com-
pensated by the increasing number of ﬁrms. Comparing the growth rates,
it seems that ﬁrms substitute a part of employees covered by social security
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Table 8.5 Number of ﬁrms, average ﬁrm size, and employment growth on ﬁrm level in
Germany (1993–2000)
Firm size
Employees  Employment growth
covered by 
Employees  All employees social security
No. of  All covered by 
Year ﬁrms Mean CV Mean CV employees social security
1993 1,596,596 18.50 0.13 14.78 0.10
1994 1,608,418 18.24 0.12 14.72 0.10 –1.9 1.1
1995 1,624,600 18.21 0.14 14.63 0.12 1.9 –1.1
1996 1,633,744 17.85 0.14 13.93 0.12 1.6 0.0
1997 1,639,029 17.46 0.14 13.62 0.12 1.4 –5.2
1998 1,643,586 17.41 0.14 13.48 0.12 2.0 –4.3
1999 1,652,821 17.19 0.15 13.58 0.13 –3.2 –2.4
2000 1,712,406 16.65 0.15 13.28 0.12 0.5 –3.8
Source: IAB Establishment Panel 1993–2000, weighted values.
Note: Firms with at least one employee covered by social security are included. CV   coeﬃcient of
variation.by workers with no connection to the social security system—for example,
freelancers or low wage earners. But due to the increasing coeﬃcient of
variation, one cannot be sure about this. Concerning their average number
of employees, German ﬁrms became more heterogeneous during our ob-
servation period.16
Organizational change is responsible for the increasing number of newly
founded ﬁrms and the downsizing of the existing ﬁrms. There were many
outsourcing activities in Germany, especially at the end of the 1990s. The
newly founded ﬁrms have a more homogenous workforce than the “old”
ﬁrms had before the outsourcing. Therefore, we expect that the wage dis-
persion between ﬁrms is increasing during the 1990s, while the within-ﬁrm
wage variance in decreasing. In other words, we expect larger ﬁrm eﬀects
at the end of our observation period due to more (and smaller) high- and
low-wage ﬁrms.
8.4.1 Structure of Wages within and between Firms
In this section, we discuss the development of wages on ﬁrm level and
worker level during the 1990s. The descriptive statistics are presented in the
appendix tables 8C.1 (unweighted values) and 8C.2 (weighted values). In
ﬁgure 8.1,we plot the kernel densities of the workers’ log wage distribution
in the years 1993, 1995, and 2000 and in ﬁgure 8.2 the distribution of the
ﬁrm average wage for the same years.17
The distribution of workers’ wages shifted to the right, and the disper-
sion of wages is increased. This means that higher wages increased more
than lower wages. The distribution of ﬁrm average wage shifted also to the
right and exhibits a higher dispersion. Germany has, in the year 2000, more
high- and low-wage ﬁrms than in 1993. Appendix table 8C.1 supports this
result: the standard deviation of the employees’ and ﬁrms’ average wage in-
creases in our observation period. Workers’ and ﬁrms’ wages became more
unequal in Germany during the 1990s.
How is the observed within-ﬁrm wage dispersion aﬀected by our ex-
ample of a labor market institution, namely collective contracts?
The results of matching ﬁrms with and without collective contracts (sec-
ond row in appendix table 8G.1) shows no signiﬁcant wage compression in
ﬁrms covered by collective contracts compared to nonunionized ﬁrms. The
average wage in ﬁrms with a collective contract is higher, but signiﬁcantly
only in the boom year 2000. Collective contracts shift the within-wage dis-
tribution to the right, on the upper bound of wages as well as on the lower
bound. The mean comparison shows that for discussing the descriptive
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16. Details of the ﬁrm size distribution shows especially large ﬁrms downsize during the
1990s. The increase of the coeﬃcient of variation is, therefore, determined by medium-sized
ﬁrms.
17. We cut oﬀ all censored wages for ﬁgure 8.1.Fig. 8.1 German workers’ and ﬁrms’ wage distribution in 1993, 1995, and 2000: In-
dividual wage by year
Source: LIAB cross-sectional model, version 1.
Fig. 8.2 German workers’ and ﬁrms’ wage distribution in 1993, 1995, and 2000:
Firm average wage by year
Source: LIAB cross-sectional model, version 1.results, we do not have to take especially into account a clear diﬀerence be-
tween unionized and nonunionized ﬁrms.
Table 8C.1 shows the following:
• The higher standard deviation is mostly driven by the development at
the upper bound of wages on individual and ﬁrm level. The logs of in-
dividuals’ and ﬁrms’ wages were rising by about 0.1 log points in the
90th percentile, but in the 10th percentile, the individual wage rises by
0.05 log points, and the ﬁrm wage even decreased slightly.
• While at the upper bound of the ﬁrms’ wage distribution the within-
wage dispersion became more unequal (column: average standard de-
viation of ﬁrms’ average wage), at the lower bound of the ﬁrms’ wage
distribution, the within-wage dispersion became more equal.
• The average standard deviation of ﬁrms’ average wage was about 30
percent of the overall average wage. This means that still a bulk of
wage variation in the German economy was within ﬁrms, not between
ﬁrms, but the latter became more important during the end of the ob-
servation period.
• The distribution of the individual wage shifted to the right. That is, the
weight of higher wages has increased, which is also true for the distri-
bution of ﬁrms’ average wage, because the proportion of high-wage
ﬁrms increased from 1993 onward. The contrast between the distribu-
tions for the years 1993 and 2000 is very clear, whereas the 1995 distri-
bution is in-between.
• Workers aged twenty-ﬁve to thirty and workers aged forty-ﬁve to ﬁfty
exhibited a similar development of wages (appendix table 8C.1).
Again, wages at the upper bound of the wage distribution increased
much more than at the lower bound.
• The wages for persons aged forty-ﬁve to ﬁfty were higher than for
younger people. This can only partly be explained by the fact that
larger ﬁrms pay higher wages and employ older workers. The correla-
tion between the log size and the average age of workers in ﬁrms is
0.111 in 1993, 0.026 in 1995, and only 0.02 in 2000 (but all coeﬃcients
are signiﬁcant on the 5 percent level). Wage regressions show the usual
U-shaped wage return rate for age. One year older corresponds, ceteris
paribus, to a higher wage for workers aged thirty of 2.8 percent (aged
forty: 1.6 percent; aged ﬁfty: 0.4 percent).18
• The correlation between the average tenure and the ﬁrm size de-
creases. The (log) size correlates with the average tenure on ﬁrm level
in the year 1996 with 0.375 and in 2000 with 0.284 (1993, 1995 not ap-
plicable). One interpretation of this result is that in stable or slump
years, larger ﬁrms keep their workers with longer job duration more
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18. These results refer to the observation period 1996 to 2001.than in boom years. Another interpretation is simply that large ﬁrms
grow in boom years.19 We have to leave open here whether the weaker
correlation in 2000 also corresponds with worker mobility mostly
driven by employers or the respective employees (we come back to this
point by discussing the mobility results). However, wage regressions
show that the average wage return for one additional year of job dura-
tion is, ceteris paribus, 2.1 percent in the time period 1996 to 2001.
Beside these descriptive results, linked employer-employee data allow
computing the proportion of the variance of wages that can be explained by
the variance of human capital and by the variance of ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀects
(Groshen 1989, 1991; Stephan 2001). Table 8.6 shows the coeﬃcient of de-
termination, R2, which can be attributed to human capital, ﬁrm-speciﬁc
eﬀects, and their interaction by estimating a Mincerian earnings function.
For the years 1993 to 2000, a clear trend emerges: the importance of the
ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀect increases, whereas that of the human capital eﬀect de-
creases. This means that unobserved ﬁrm eﬀects or sorting to ﬁrms ac-
cording to unobserved personal characteristics aﬀect more and more the
distribution of wages, whereas sorting according to observed personal
characteristics plays a smaller role. This may be driven by the decreasing
ﬁrm size, which is accompanied by more within-homogeneity of ﬁrms. The
R2 related to the interaction of ﬁrm-speciﬁc and human capital eﬀects re-
mains almost stable over that time period. These results ﬁt very well into
the results of our descriptive analyses of the wage structure.
Wage levels and within-ﬁrm wage variance are correlated positively (ap-
pendix table 8C.1). Of course, larger ﬁrms pay higher wages and use a wider
range of diﬀerent occupations, but the increasing within variance of wages
in the observation period can only be partly explained by a wider range of
occupations.20
8.4.2 Occupational Wage Diﬀerentials and 
Heterogeneity of Workers and Firms
We analyze more deeply the relation between occupations and wages:
What is the reason for wage diﬀerentials between occupations? Can occu-
pational wage diﬀerentials be explained by the following?
•D i ﬀerences in the productivity of occupations
• Observed diﬀerences in characteristics of ﬁrms that have a demand for
these occupations
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19. This seems unlikely. A comparison of the weighted and unweighted values in appendix
table 8C.5 shows that the employment growth in 2000 is “larger” (in the sense of a less nega-
tive growth) in smaller establishments.
20. This can be seen in table 8C.5: ﬁrms use less occupations at the end of our observation
period than at the beginning. The nearly unchanged weighted values for the observed time pe-
riod show that only larger ﬁrms reduced their number of occupations.• Unobserved diﬀerences in characteristics of ﬁrms that have a demand
for these occupations
• Unobserved diﬀerences in employees that work in this occupation
To answer this question, we estimate wage regressions using the LIAB
longitudinal data.21 The ﬁrst regression model (1) includes ten covariates
of personal characteristics xit (like job tenure, education level, job experi-
ence, and others) and dummies Bitfor ten occupational groups. The second
model (2) uses in addition twenty-one diﬀerent observable ﬁrm character-
istics wjt (like their reorganization activities, the existence of a workers
council or collective agreement, worker ﬂow characteristics [i.e., the churn-
ing rate], and many others).22 Model (3) includes additionally unobserved
ﬁrm heterogeneity ψj and unobserved person heterogeneity  i. The three
models are, therefore, formulated as23
(1) yit    xit  Βitζ   εit
(2) yit    xit  Βitζ   wjt   εit
(3) yit    xit  Βitζ   wjt    ι   ψj   εit.
The time index trefers to June 30th of each year between 1996 and 2001.
To estimate model (3), we sweep out the unobserved heterogeneities on
ﬁrm and worker level by subtracting averages on spell level (a spell is de-
ﬁned by an unique worker-ﬁrm combination). A short description of this
“spell-ﬁxed-eﬀect” regression gives us appendix F. The models (1) and (2)
are pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. The wage regressions
are based on 2,282,926 observations (worker years) of 673,606 full-time
workers. We are interested in the zeta coeﬃcients of the occupation groups
(table 8.7).
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21. In order to downsize the wide range of occupations, we recode the three-digit occupa-
tional code into ten occupational groups. The original three-digit-code does not ﬁt well into
up-to-date international classiﬁcations (ISCO-88 would be possible with the applicable three-
digit code).
22. All covariates for the models (1) to (3) are listed in appendix D.
23. Symbols and indexes are explained in appendix E.
Table 8.6 Analysis of variance of workers’ wages
Adjusted R2 of ANOVA
1993 1995 2000
Firm eﬀects 0.273 0.284 0.347
Human capital 0.448 0.445 0.386
Human capital   ﬁrm eﬀects 0.587 0.586 0.595
Source: LIAB cross-sectional model, version 1.
Note: Firms with at least twenty-ﬁve full-time employees are included.The occupational returns in column (1) control only for observed worker
characteristics. The results in column (2) control additionally for observed
ﬁrm characteristics. The more the speciﬁc occupational group is—relative
to the unskilled manual occupations—sorted into high-wage ﬁrms (ex-
pressed by wjt ), the lower is the zeta coeﬃcient of model (2) compared to
model (1). But they diﬀer only slightly. Accordingly, only a small part of oc-
cupational wage diﬀerentials can be explained by diﬀerences in observed
characteristics of ﬁrms that have a demand for these occupations. Excep-
tions of the small, observable ﬁrm eﬀects are the skilled service occupa-
tions and semiprofessionals or professionals, meaning that especially
high-wage ﬁrms employ workers with such occupations.
Model (3) controls additionally for unobserved heterogeneity of work-
ers and ﬁrms. The interpretation of the diﬀerences between the zeta coeﬃ-
cients from model (2) and (3) is quite similar. The more the occupational
wage diﬀerentials could be explained by unobserved characteristics of
workers and ﬁrms, the lower is the zeta coeﬃcient in model (3) compared
to model (2). In most cases, the zeta coeﬃcient is even substantially lower.
Only for skilled service occupations do the unobserved worker and ﬁrm
characteristics have just a small eﬀect on the wage return rates in this oc-
cupational group.
To summarize, if we control for unobserved ﬁrm and worker character-
istics, there are often only small wage diﬀerences between diﬀerent occu-
pational groups. Thus, we can conclude that ﬁrms set wages not only by oc-
cupations but also for other observed and unobserved person and ﬁrm
characteristics.
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Table 8.7 ζ coeﬃcients for occupational groups in West Germany (1996–2001)
Coeﬃcients from model:
(1) (2) (3)
Unskilled manual occupations Reference
Skilled manual occupations 0.196 0.146 0.019
Technicians, engineers 0.293 0.284 0.058
Unskilled service occupations n.s. –0.004 n.s.
Skilled service occupations 0.148 0.045 0.031
Semiprofessionals 0.303 0.146 0.059
Professionals 0.467 0.342 0.100
Unskilled civil servant occupations 0.058 0.047 0.003
Skilled civil servant occupations 0.262 0.223 0.048
Managers 0.458 0.426 0.127
Source: LIAB longitudinal model, version 1 for 1996 to 2001.
Notes:Uses 2.28 million yit-observations; all coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant on a level of   0.01;
n.s.   not signiﬁcant; models are explained in the text.To investigate this further, table 8.8 shows the correlations of the ob-
served and unobserved workers’ and ﬁrms’ characteristics.
Like in many countries,24 the correlation between unobserved ﬁrm and
worker characteristics, corr(  ˆ,ψ)   –0.0960, has the wrong sign if one ex-
pects that “good” employers have “good” workers.25 Also, the correlation
between unobserved ﬁrm characteristics, ψ, and observed worker charac-
teristics, wjt  ˆ, looks somewhat skewed.26 Whereas a plausible result is that
observed and unobserved worker characteristics correlate positively,
corr(  ˆ, xjt  ˆ)   0,3787. This means that high-skilled workers also accumu-
late unobserved abilities for which employers pay higher wages.
The correlation of the observed ﬁrm characteristics with the observed
and unobserved worker characteristics is weak. This suggests that the esti-
mated coeﬃcients of one side of the labor market are not aﬀected if we ig-
nore the other side. But, on the other hand, as shown for the occupational
groups in table 8.7, the returns for observable workers’ characteristics
sometimes diﬀer remarkably if we control for observed and unobserved
ﬁrm characteristics.
Referring to the unobserved worker heterogeneities, further investiga-
tions (Alda 2006) show that unobservable good workers are more likely to
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24. Abowd, Creecy, and Kramarz (2002) reports a strong negative correlation of –0.283 for
the French and –0.025 for Washington State data. Goux and Maurin (1999) estimate (de-
pending on the time period)  0.01 to –0.32. Gruetter and Lalive (2003) report –0.543 for Aus-
tria, and Barth and Dale-Olsen (2003) –0.47 to –0.53 for Denmark.
25. Andrews, Schank, and Upward (2004) report for Germany a correlation of nearly zero
(–0.0172) in the time period 1993 to 1997 with comparable LIAB data, but fewer and diﬀer-
ent covariates. One reason for their weak correlation is that they did not use characteristics of
individuals that describe their labor market behavior (e.g., times of unemployment and leave
of absence for family phases). These covariates are positive correlated with the unobserved
person eﬀects (meaning that the higher the integration in the labor market and the less there
are events and times of unemployment, the higher is the unobserved person eﬀect on wages).
The correlation with the vector of covariates referring to labor market integration and the un-
observed person eﬀect  i is   0.1526.
26. The reason might be too little turnover between the ﬁrms in the sample.




j xit  ˆ wjt  ˆ
Unobserved worker characteristics (  ˆ
i) 1.0000
Unobserved ﬁrm characteristics (ψ ˆ
j) –0.0960 1.0000
Observed worker characteristics (xit  ˆ) 0.3787 0.0002 1.0000
Observed ﬁrm characteristics (wjt  ˆ) –0.0276 –0.2376 –0.0417 1.0000
Source: LIAB longitudinal model, version 1 for 1996 to 2001.
Note: The table uses 673,606 averages on the level of persons, based on 2,282,926 
yit-observations.be sorted into larger ﬁrms, in ﬁrms that reduce hierarchies and increase
workers’ responsibilities, in ﬁrms that have less turnover, and those who
are tied by collective agreement on the ﬁrm level.27
8.4.3 Wage Dynamics
The statistics for the wage dynamics are printed in appendix tables 8C.3
and 8C.4. Figure 8.3 shows the kernel densities for the change in wages on
individual, ﬁgure 8.4 on the ﬁrm level.
The change in wage for workers (ﬁgure 8.3) and the change of the ﬁrms’
average wage (ﬁgure 8.4) give no clear picture. Both distributions shift to
the right from 1993 to 1995. Between 1995 and 2000, there is a slight shift
to the left. The peak of the density function changes only for individuals.
On the ﬁrm level, the peaks are in all years nearly on the same level.
The change of wages varies not only between ﬁrms. There is also a wide
range of within variation in the change of wages, increasing during the ob-
servation period. The 90/10 ratio of the standard deviation of the change
in ﬁrms’ average wage is 2.383 in the year 1993, 2.545 in 1995, and 2.814 in
the year 2000. Two interpretations are possible:
First, rising wage growth rate diﬀerences might reﬂect wage-level diﬀer-
ences. Maybe the wages in human capital-intensive ﬁrms grew very fast,
while wages remain nearly unchanged in nonintensive ﬁrms. A tied argu-
ment is that heterogeneous ﬁrms have a large mixture of skills. Then there
would be a high variance of wage growth rates within ﬁrms and little vari-
ation in the means across ﬁrms.
Second, the growth rate diﬀerences might reﬂect institutional or sectoral
diﬀerences. These could be unions or industries. Collective contracts, for
instance, might compress wages as well as their growth rates. To test this
hypothesis, we estimate the eﬀect of collective contracts on change in
wages by a matching approach (appendix G). But the results only partly
support the second hypotheses, because ﬁrms with and without collective
contracts do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly in their average change in wages in any
observed year. Only the coeﬃcient of variation of the change in wages is in
all years lower in unionized ﬁrms, signiﬁcantly in the year 1993 and in
2000. Firms covered by collective contracts treat their workers regarding
the wage change more equally than nonunionized ﬁrms.
However, depending on the year, the standard deviation of the change in
ﬁrms’ average wage is higher than the average change in workers’ wage.
Further analyses are needed to interpret this. From the rough tenure vari-
able in the LIAB cross-sectional model (appendix table 8C.3), we can
deduce no clear interpretation for the results. If wages within a ﬁrm grow
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27. If ﬁrms pay wages by collective agreement on branch level, the averages of the unob-
served person eﬀects on ﬁrm level are smaller, but, nevertheless, higher than in ﬁrms not cov-
ered by unions. Hence, the wage regressions control for the observable average eﬀect of col-
lective agreement on the ﬁrm and branch levels.Fig. 8.3 Change in log wages on worker and ﬁrm level: Individual wage change 
by year
Source: LIAB cross-sectional model, version 1.
Fig. 8.4 Change in log wages on worker and ﬁrm level: Firm average wage change 
by year
Source: LIAB cross-sectional model, version 1.differently, the average change in wages for workers is not able to tell us
what drives this development. The high standard deviation of wage
changes supports this argument. It seems that within ﬁrms, winners and
losers (in terms of their wage change) coexist at the same time. Diﬀerent
working conditions might be a reason, for example, ﬁxed in the design of
the working contract at the date of entrance assuming it is a ﬁrm’s reaction
of a yearly changing economic environment.
In table 8.9,we investigate this further by looking at the change in wages
using the LIAB longitudinal model due to a more precise record of the
tenure variable. The table summarizes the change in wages by years of job
duration.
We distinguish between males and females. The reason for this is that—
despite that males have, on average, higher wage growth rates than fe-
males—we can observe a fairly clear trend for male workers. An entrance
cohort at a certain time can be identiﬁed by diagonals. Each year an en-
trance cohort is going one group downward until they ﬁnally reach the
group with job duration of over ﬁve years. The male entrance cohort 1997
to 1998 (this is the category tenure one to two years in the year 1999) has in
all years the highest growth rates relative to all other groups. It follows that
wage growth rates are joined with the date of entrance in a ﬁrm. Rising
wage diﬀerentials between otherwise equal workers (e.g., regarding their
skills or occupation) within ﬁrms are, therefore, to some extent a conse-
quence of their date of entrance into the ﬁrm, meaning that rising wage dif-
ferentials between ﬁrms for workers with comparable human capital are
partly a result of ﬁrm heterogeneities.
How much of the wage change variance is attributed to ﬁrms’ ﬁxed eﬀect
and how much to occupations? We again use analysis of variance, but in-
stead of a vector of human capital, we apply the information of workers’
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Table 8.9 Change in wages by job tenure (1999–2001)
Males Females
1999 2000 2001 1999 2000 2001
All employees 126.75 54.51 46.03 86.64 35.93 24.62
Tenure
Less than 1 year 88.08 –5.82 –9.19 47.25 37.75 40.09
1–2 years 178.93 99.14 99.51 97.52 91.63 64.62
2–3 years 150.89 130.96 95.27 49.41 65.12 56.26
3–4 years 158.46 95.35 116.11 87.93 41.84 58.05
4–5 years 97.17 86.50 67.76 62.83 50.19 28.90
5  years 125.64 89.08 72.00 67.60 28.60 17.54
Source: LIAB longitudinal model, version 1.
Note: Monthly gross average wage change in euros.occupation. We estimate three regression models: the ﬁrst regresses the
change in wages only on ﬁxed eﬀects for about 330 occupations. The sec-
ond includes only ﬁxed-ﬁrm eﬀects. The third includes occupational as
well as ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects. Table 8.10 shows the adjusted R2 for the regres-
sion models.
In 1993, the occupation has a much larger eﬀect on the change in wages
than the ﬁrm. This suggests that ﬁrms set wages more by occupations than
due to their own heterogeneities. In 1995, there is nearly no diﬀerence be-
tween ﬁrm and occupational eﬀects on the change in wages. In 2000, the in-
ﬂuence of both, ﬁrms and occupation, on the average wage change is ris-
ing. The ﬁrm eﬀect on wage changes became higher during the observation
period, which is a similar development for wage levels (table 8.6). Also, the
interpretation is quite the same. Firm heterogeneities became more impor-
tant for the development of workers’ wages. The occupation eﬀect on the
change in wages exhibits no clear time trend. However, in each year, the oc-
cupation better explains the variance in the change of wages for workers
than the ﬁrm.
The analysis of table 8.10 allows us to come back to the interpretation
that ﬁrm heterogeneities are more important for the change of worker
wages within speciﬁc entrance cohorts. Table 8.11 repeats the analyses of
variance of table 8.10, but now we run separate regressions for each en-
trance cohort.28
For most of the entrance cohorts—especially for the later ones—the
picture changed, compared to table 8.10. As suggested by discussing table
8.9, the ﬁrm better explains the variance of wage changes of employees
with shorter durations. Only for workers with job durations of more than
eight years in 1997 does the occupation better predict the change in wages
than the ﬁrm. Comparing 1997 and 2000 exhibits the same picture as the
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28. The results of tables 8.10 and 8.11 are not directly comparable because we have to switch
between the LIAB data models.
Table 8.10 Analysis of variance of changes in workers’ log wages referring to
occupation and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects
Adjusted R2 of ANOVA
1993 1995 2000
Occupation 0.1801 0.1383 0.1689
Firm 0.0856 0.1275 0.1341
Occupation   ﬁrm 0.2171 0.2214 0.2474
Source: LIAB cross-sectional model, version 1.
Note: About 330 occupations according to the three-digit classiﬁcation in the administrative
data are included.other statistics: in 2000, the ﬁrm eﬀects are more important than in 1997,
and the human capital (here approximated by occupation) can explain less
of the change of workers wages. The combination of the occupation and
the ﬁrm explains the variance of the wage change of earlier entrance co-
horts in 2000 better than in 1997.
To conclude, wage growth rates are joined with the date of entrance by
the employer. In addition, ﬁrms employ a large mixture of skills. This
means there is a lot of within-variance of the change in wages and less vari-
ation in the means across ﬁrms, as shown in ﬁgures 8.3 and 8.4.
8.4.4 Mobility
This section discusses exit and entry rates on the establishment level. The
diﬀerences between weighted and unweighted values are here more impor-
tant, because in a smaller ﬁrm, one exiting worker increases the proportion
of exits more than in a larger one. Due to the oversampling of larger ﬁrms
in our sample, weighted values reﬂect the mobility for the typical German
ﬁrm; unweighted values express the mobility in larger ﬁrms.
The growth rate of the ﬁrm size is computed as 2(Nt – Nt–1)/(Nt   Nt–1)
with N as the total number of full-time workers. Entry and exit rates were
constructed as 2Et/(Nt   Nt–1). E is the total number of exits or entries in
the ﬁrm. The correlations are computed with the log wages on the ﬁrm
level. We calculated the mobility patterns separately for high-wage jobs,
low-wage jobs, and for all jobs.
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Table 8.11 Analysis of variance of changes in workers’ log wages referring to
occupation and ﬁrm eﬀects by tenure
Adjusted R2 of ANOVA
Firm  
Occupation Firm occupation
Entrance cohort 1997 2000 1997 2000 1997 2000
1999/2000 0.209 0.266 0.381
1998/1999 0.110 0.183 0.228
1997/1998 0.121 0.174 0.240
1996/1997 0.216 0.141 0.232 0.143 0.328 0.227
1995/1996 0.129 0.135 0.186 0.157 0.235 0.222
1994/1995 0.151 0.125 0.178 0.158 0.254 0.230
1993/1994 0.159 0.107 0.157 0.145 0.234 0.207
1992/1993 0.144 0.146 0.185 0.172 0.233 0.247
1991/1992 0.123 0.145 0.134 0.147 0.202 0.241
1990/1991 0.127 0.141 0.149 0.169 0.210 0.231
1990 and earlier 0.115 0.114 0.093 0.137 0.175 0.203
Source: LIAB longitudinal model, version 1.Mobility: All Jobs
Appendix table 8C.5 presents the results for all jobs. As mentioned in sec-
tion 8.3, the average ﬁrm size decreases during the 1990s (table 8.5), but the
decreasing ﬁrm size in our sample is also partly a result of sample attrition.
The weighted values correct for this selectivity. The large ﬁrm size and the
large standard deviation of the ﬁrm size in the unweighted values compared
with the weighted values is a typical result of the oversampling. However,
according to other studies, larger German ﬁrms especially became smaller
in the second half of the 1990s because of in- and outsourcing. Therefore,
we observe a negative growth of full-time jobs on the establishment level. As
noted in section 8.2, this decline in the number of full-time jobs is partly
compensated by an increasing number of part-time jobs.
The number of occupations declines during the period in larger ﬁrms by
approximately 30 percent. This may be a result of the declining ﬁrm size,
but could also reﬂect the old-fashioned occupational classiﬁcation system
of the 1970s. Occupations in the declining industrial sector are more mi-
croscopically classiﬁed than occupations in the expanding service sector.
Last but not least, ﬁrms sometimes really drive down their number of oc-
cupations to concentrate on their core business.
The exit rate for all jobs rises from 0.19 to 0.23 in our observation period.
These values are slightly higher than in Norway and Sweden, but still lower
than in Denmark, France, or Italy. The entry rate rises from 0.16 to 0.18.
This is comparable to the Nordic countries. The rising entry and exit rates
may be attributable to the ﬂexibilization of the labor market institutions.
Furthermore, the exit rates are higher than the entry rates, reﬂecting the
decline of full-time employment in the 1990s.
Could the rising ﬁrm turnover be connected to the declining coverage of
collective contracts?
As the matching of ﬁrms with and without collective contracts (appen-
dix table 8G.1) shows: exit rates in ﬁrms with collective contracts are by 7.7
percent signiﬁcantly lower in the slump year 1993. At other points of the
business cycle, there are no diﬀerences between unionized and nonunion-
ized ﬁrms. Also, the entry rates diﬀer in both types of ﬁrms. In 1993 and
2000, ﬁrms with a collective contract hire signiﬁcantly fewer employees (on
average, about 3 percent). These mean comparisons show that especially in
more turbulent economic times, collective contracts inﬂuence mobility
patterns. They are protecting insiders, at least in the years 1993 and 1995
(last column of appendix table 8G.1).
However, despite the institutional treatment, as expected, high- and low-
wage ﬁrms diﬀer in their mobility patterns. Firms in the top decile of ﬁrm
wages exhibit lower exit and entry rates than ﬁrms in the bottom decile. This
is shown by the unweighted as well as the weighted results.
The growing mobility of workers has consequences for the percentage of
Wage Structure and Labor Mobility in the West German Private Sector 285core workers (deﬁned as persons with job tenure over three years). There
are fewer core workers in the year 2000 than in former years. Collective
contracts could not prevent this development, as the mean comparison of
the propensity score matching shows (appendix table 8G.1, last column):
Firms with collective contracts protect—compared to ﬁrms without col-
lective contracts—insiders in the years 1993 and 1995 better than in 2000,
and, consequently, the diﬀerence between the two groups diminishes.
Finally, the correlation patterns in Mobility: All Jobs show:
• The correlation of the exit and entry rates with the average ﬁrm wage is
negative. This means that high-wage ﬁrms have a lower turnover. The
reason for this may be that ﬁrms try to keep their human capital. But
the correlation is getting weaker at the end of the observation period.
• As expected, exit rates are lower and entry rates are higher if ﬁrms
raise the wages for their workers. This suggests that growing ﬁrms raise
wages to attract new workers.
• Firms with a higher variance of wages exhibit higher worker mobility,
shown by the positive correlation between the entry/exit rate and the
standard deviation of the average wage.
Mobility: High-Level Jobs and Mobility: Low-Level Jobs
The mobility patterns of all jobs, high-level jobs, and low-level jobs diﬀer
in some points. The deﬁnition of high- and low-level jobs is based on the
occupational classiﬁcation (on a three-digit level). We rank occupations by
their median wage. High-level jobs are above the 80th percentile of the
wage distribution. Low-level jobs are below the 20th percentile.
The following are the main results:
• High- and low-level jobs are a matter of larger establishment. There-
fore, the number of high- and low-level jobs diﬀers strongly between
weighted and unweighted values.
• As expected, high-wage earners are less mobile in high-wage ﬁrms and
more mobile in low-wage ﬁrms (low-level jobs and vice versa). In all
kind of ﬁrms, the exit and entry rates of low-level jobs are higher than
the rates of high-level jobs. This is consistent with predictions of hu-
man capital theory. High-wage workers have accumulated more ﬁrm-
speciﬁc human capital and receive, therefore, higher returns if they
stay in the ﬁrm.
• In 2000, the entry rate of low-level jobs is higher than the exit rate. This
suggests an expanding sector of low-wage jobs in Germany.
• High-wage ﬁrms have a lower turnover of high-level jobs and a higher
turnover of low-level jobs. If high-wage ﬁrms can be regarded as high
human capital ﬁrms, they have little reason for a high turnover.
• The correlation between the average wage change and the entry rates
is for both kinds of jobs negative in 1995 and positive in 2000. If ﬁrms
286 Holger Alda, Lutz Bellmann, and Hermann Gartnergrow in boom years, then these ﬁrms may raise their wages to attract
workers. A supporting argument is—as already discussed in section
8.4.2 (table 8.8)—that the change in wages for the new hires (with job
duration of one to three years) is higher than for employees with
longer job tenure.
The relation between the wage dispersion in a ﬁrm and the turnover of
the high-level jobs is more complicated. The turnover of high- and low-
level jobs is lower if the wages within ﬁrm are more compressed—with only
one exception (entry rate of high-level jobs in 1993). We can expect this
only for the low-level jobs. As stated in section 8.2, in ﬁrms with workers
councils or collective contracts, the wages are more compressed, and low-
wage workers are better protected against dismissals. It seems that high-
wage earners more often leave ﬁrms with compressed wage structures
(table 8.12).
There are two diﬀerences between the appendix tables 8C.6 and 8C.7
and table 8.12. First, the top, middle, and bottom earners are not calcu-
lated by the median wage of occupations but by the wage of people.29 Sec-
ond, we calculate the 90th percentile instead of the 80th percentile. How-
ever, table 8.12 shows that middle earners are the group with the most
stable employment. This may be an eﬀect of the strong insider position of
skilled blue-collar workers resulting from the German apprenticeship sys-
tem. The wages for skilled blue-collar workers are ﬁxed by collective agree-
ments, and unemployment for this skill group is low. Many ﬁrms that are
not covered by unions also pay tariﬀ wages if they require these skills, so
that blue-collar workers—who are the majority of middle earners—have
no incentives to change their employer.
The mobility of bottom earners is often induced by the employer, while
top earners more often exit from ﬁrms with a compressed wage structure.30
This suggests that they quit more often to seek their chances elsewhere.
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29. Middle-wage earners are in the 45th to 55th percentile of the wage distribution.
30. A ﬁrm has a compressed wage structure if the value of the 90/50 ratio of the within-ﬁrm
wage distribution is below the average of the 90/50 ratio of all ﬁrms in the German economy.
A spread out wage structure is deﬁned for ﬁrms who have a 90/50 ratio above this average.
Table 8.12 Exit rates of top, middle, and bottom earners
1993 1995 2000
90th percentile wage (top earners) 0.133 0.131 0.178
Median-wage (middle earners) 0.129 0.118 0.158
10th percentile wage (bottom earners) 0.232 0.219 0.283
Exit-90th percentile wage (compressed) 0.139 0.145 0.211
Exit-90th percentile wage (spread out) 0.126 0.116 0.142
Source: LIAB cross-sectional model, version 1.8.5 Summary and Outlook
The West German private sector is characterized by a rising inequality
of wages during the 1990s. At the same time, ﬁrm heterogeneities became
more important for the wage setting and the within- and between-ﬁrm vari-
ation of wages. To understand the development of wages, we must, there-
fore, ask, what do the ﬁrms do?
There were a lot of reorganization activities in German ﬁrms in the 1990s.
Outsourcing, new customer-producer relationships, and changes in the
work organization were necessary for making ﬁrms more competitive. Such
activities change the wage structure between and within ﬁrms. Wage struc-
tures in Germany are rather rigid, and payment adjustments can be more
expected via the mobility of workers. Skill-biased technological change
aﬀects both the risks of job loss and the wage development of diﬀerent skill
groups (e.g., Bauer and Bender 2002; Kölling and Schank 2003). The insti-
tutional frame of the German labor market can be described more or less as
protecting insiders. But during the 1990s, employers gain more ﬂexibility in
designing ﬁxed-term contracts and employing temporary workers. All this
is resulting in a large mixture of heterogeneous workers in heterogeneous
ﬁrms, in the sense that some of them are more aﬀected by new developments
than others. This explains a part of the rising wage inequality and the larger
wage dispersion.
The following are further results of analyzing the within and between-
variance of wage levels:
• The rising within-variance of wages can only be partly explained by a
change in ﬁrms’ mixture of occupations.31 The occupational wage dif-
ferentials are aﬀected by sorting and unobserved characteristics of
workers. If we controlled for unobserved ﬁrm and worker characteris-
tics, there are only small occupational wage diﬀerentials. This means
that ﬁrms set wages not only by occupations but also for other ob-
served and, especially, unobserved human capital. For example, un-
observable good workers work more often in ﬁrms that reduce hierar-
chies, improve worker responsibilities, and have fewer worker ﬂows.
• The wage structure of ﬁrms is only partly aﬀected by unions. Unionized
ﬁrms pay in 2000, on average, signiﬁcantly higher wages and have in
1995 a more compressed wage structure, whereas in other years, we ﬁnd
no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between unionized and nonunionized ﬁrms.
• A decomposition of the variance of wages shows that the importance
of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀect increases, whereas that of the human capital
eﬀect decreases. The R2 attributed to the interaction of both human
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31. We estimate an average wage return rate for workers of, ceteris paribus, 1 percent, if
their employer drives down the proportion of diﬀerent occupations in his or her ﬁrm by 5 per-
cent (relative to all of his or her employees).capital and ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀects remains almost stable during the years
1993 to 2000.
Analyses of the wage changes show that ﬁrms exhibit a wide range of
change in wages:
• In general, workers with shorter job durations receive higher wage
changes than workers with longer job durations.
• The range of the change in wage, especially on the individual level, is
getting wider during the 1990s. The 90/10 ratio of the standard devia-
tion of the change in ﬁrms average wage is 2.383 in 1993 and 2.814 in
the year 2000, whereas the mean remains nearly unchanged.
• Referring to all employees, it looks like wage changes are aﬀected
more by occupation than by ﬁrm. But wage growth rates are con-
nected with the date of entry in a ﬁrm—and the wage growth rates of
the same entrance cohort diﬀer between heterogeneous ﬁrms. If we
control for the date of entry, the ﬁrm explains the change in wages bet-
ter than the occupation.
• We ﬁnd nearly no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between unionized ﬁrms and
nonunionized ones. Only in 1995 is the change in wages for workers
more compressed if wages are collectively bargained.
The worker mobility increased in the second half of the 1990s and sug-
gests that this is not only driven by the business cycle but also by a trend of
deregulation of the German labor market. On the other hand, several in-
stitutions tend to protect insiders. It can be concluded that a notable part
of the higher mobility in the second half of the 1990s was undertaken by a
minority of employees, while the majority of employees still remained in
stable employment.
Such mobility patterns also become obvious in our tables for the cross-
country comparison (appendix tables 8C.5 to 8C.7):
• While the entry rates in most cases grew moderately (but, nevertheless,
there was more mobility), the exit rates become higher during the
1990s.
• Nevertheless, stable employment is still normal in Germany. The pro-
tection of insiders became most obvious in the percentage of workers
with a duration of job tenure of more than three years. Especially in
stable years, the proportion of core (full-time) workers rises in German
establishments.
What can be topics for future research? There are two general aspects: the
development of the data, and questions about wages and mobility patterns.
The linked employer-employee data from Germany (LIAB) take major
steps forward. New technologies allow the building up of better data sets,
making a wider range of investigations possible. In the foreground of the
Wage Structure and Labor Mobility in the West German Private Sector 289further development of the LIAB is the association of the two LIAB data
models. This means the integration of workers’ histories with the cross-
sectional model for all ﬁrms of the IAB establishment panel. Meanwhile,
over 10,000 ﬁrms join in the West and nearly 5,000 in the East Germany
panel. Integrating key variables to the associated administrative individual
data—like daily precise job durations, the wage of workers by the former
employer, durations of unemployment, participation on programs of ac-
tive labor market policy, and many more—will make research with LIAB
data not only easier, but also more fruitful.
To better understand the structure and dynamics of wages and the mo-
bility of employees in Germany, we would like to take a deeper look into
the ﬁrms in order to understand what is happening between them. Maybe
this includes ﬁrm closing and how newly founded units develop over time,
with special attention given to the in- and outsourcing activities of other
ﬁrms.32 What is the impact on the skill-wage premium? What follows for
the mobility of workers in an economy? Such questions might also give a
partial answer to how internal labor markets change over time. Do work-
ers become more equal within ﬁrms and more diﬀerent between ﬁrms?
At the end, we would like to note that—and this seems to be consistent
in a cross-country comparison—unobservable worker and ﬁrm character-
istics become more important. They are correlated with the observables
and possibly can be regarded as a key for the understanding of wage dis-
persion as well as the sorting on (national) labor markets, especially
whether countries become more equal in labor market mechanisms.
Appendix A
Description of the Data
Description of the data comes from Andrews, Schank, and Upward
(2004, 13–14).
The IAB Establishment Panel (Betriebspanel)
The IAB Establishment Panel covers the period 1993 to the present of
ﬁrms located in West and 1996 to the present in East Germany. Establish-
ments are selected by using a fairly complicated weighting procedure. The
IAB Establishment Panel covers, unweighted, 1 percent of all ﬁrms (but
nearly every larger one) and about 8 percent of all employees. Information
on each establishment includes, among others:
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32. An investigation of wage structures in newly founded units with LIAB data is given by
Brixy, Kohaut, and Schnabel (2007).• Total employment






• Technology (subjective measure)
• Organizational change
• Proﬁtability
• Age of ﬁrms and whether parent is a single ﬁrm
The Employment Statistic Register (Beschäftigtenstatistik)
For the other side of the labor market, the IAB has access to the federal
employment statistics register. It starts in 1975 in West Germany and 1992
in East Germany. It contains about 400 million records, covering about 46
million employees. Information on each worker includes the following:
• Gender, age, and nationality
• Start and end of every employment spell
• Occupation (three-digit)
• Daily gross wages (left-truncated and right-censored)
• Qualiﬁcations (education/apprenticeship)
• Industry, region
• Establishment identiﬁcation number
• Information about multiple jobs and times of unemployment
By using the establishment identiﬁcation number, the IAB is able to as-
sociate each worker in the employment statistics register with an establish-




The structure of the linked employer-employee data sets of the IAB is de-
scribed in the data sections in this chapter and in IAB Discussion Paper no.
6/2005. Hereafter, we describe how the applied key variables are deﬁned.
Wages
Wages are gross wages and include all bonus payments. The wages are
applicable on a precise daily base. They are multiplied by 30.5 to get
Wage Structure and Labor Mobility in the West German Private Sector 291monthly wages. Wages are truncated at a lower bound and censored at an
upper bound. Censored wages are imputed as described by Gartner (2005).
We deﬂate all wages by the consumer price index (2,000   100). All wages
and statistics refer to full-time employees. The monthly wages are restricted
to the interval [500; 22,026] euros (in log wages [5.5;10]).
Full-Time Employees
The employee data contain no information about the working hours,
only whether they are full-time or part-time workers. Therefore, we include
only full-time workers. Apprenticeships are excluded from all analyses.
Movers
We use the LIAB cross-sectional data. In this model, movers can only be
identiﬁed if they move to another ﬁrm, which is also part of the IAB Es-
tablishment Panel in the following year. We did not use this information for
the cross-country comparison. In the longitudinal model, it is possible to
follow the working history of people. The correlations of observed and un-
observed employer and employee characteristics are based on this LIAB
longitudinal data.
Tenure
In the cross-sectional model, it is only possible to check whether the in-
dividual identiﬁer occurs in three consecutive years. In the longitudinal
model, it is possible to compute job durations on a precise daily base (left-
censored at January 1st, 1990). We use this information to report the cor-
relation of the ﬁrm size with tenure.
Sector Classiﬁcation
We use the sector classiﬁcation from the IAB Establishment Panel. We
excluded all ﬁrms in the public sector and all ﬁrms in public ownership. In
the manufacturing sector—which is a subpopulation of the whole
sample—we exclude the agrarian sector as well as mining and construction
ﬁrms. The number of remaining ﬁrms in manufacturing are as follows:
1993: 1,161; 1995: 915; 2000: 730).
Mobility and Growth Rates
All mobility rates are based on the formula 2   Et/(Nt–1   Nt), where E
is the event (entries, exits), and N is the total number of employees. This
means, for example, that the exit rate of high-level jobs is based on all exits
of high-level jobs times two, divided by the sum of all existing high-level
jobs at time t and at time tt–1. Growth rates are quite similarly constructed:
2   (Nt – Nt–1)/(Nt_  Nt–1).
292 Holger Alda, Lutz Bellmann, and Hermann GartnerHigh- and Low-Level Jobs and Top, Middle, and Bottom Earners
To deﬁne high- and low-level jobs, we compute for each occupation (on
a three-digit level) the median wage. High-level jobs are those jobs in the
top 80 percent decile of the wage distribution, low-level jobs are in the bot-
tom 20 percent decile.
Top earners are people in the 90th percentile of the yearly wage distri-
bution, bottom earners are in the 10th percentile, and middle earners are
in the 45th to 55th percentile.
Coeﬃcient of Variation
This is constructed as r    /|y  |, where r is the coeﬃcient,   the standard
deviation, and y the (change in) wage on ﬁrm level. For the tables about
wage dynamics, the coeﬃcient of variation is much higher than for the
structure of wages. In the tables about wage dynamics, the coeﬃcient is,
therefore, divided by 100.
Size
All size information used is based only on full-time employees excluding
apprenticeships. For the cross-country comparison, there have to be at
least twenty-ﬁve full-time employees in a ﬁrm, for analyses with the longi-
tudinal LIAB data, three.
Switch Rate
The switch rate measures a change in the occupational code of a full-
time employee between t and t – 1 of all nonmovers in a ﬁrm.








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Covariates in the Wage Regressions for Table 8.6 and 8.7 
(Full Regression Results, Including Coeﬃcients, 
are Published in Alda [2006, chapter 5])
Worker Characteristics
Time/Spell Variant (  xit)
age (age2/100; age3/10,000) tenure (in years) education level
current occupation group multiple jobs (yes/no) days of employment / days
of unemployment   100
days of employment / days  number of employers number of unemployment 
unobserved   100 phases
Time/Spell Invariant
gender nationality of leave of absence (e.g.,
sabbaticals)
Firm Characteristics
Time/Spell Variant (  wit)
size (ten dummies) collective agreement (branch/ works council (yes/no)
ﬁrm level; yes/no)
economic situation  paying more than tariﬀ wages  sum of investment (log) per 
(subjective measure) (yes/no) capita
weekly worked hours outsourcing activities vacancies
organizational change number of occupations churning
proportions of ﬁxed-term contracts, females, and university degrees
Time/Spell Invariant
ownership sector (ten dummies) parent is single (yes/no) urbanity
Appendix E
Symbols and Indexes for Wage Regressions
Indexes
i: individuals j: ﬁrms t: time (years)
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  : constant
x : observable time-variant person characteristics
w : observable time-variant ﬁrm characteristics
 i : unobserved person ﬁxed-eﬀect
ψj : unobserved ﬁrm ﬁxed-eﬀect
Β : occupation groups
Note:  i and ψj include the time invariant covariates of people or ﬁrms.
Appendix F
Estimation of Fixed-Firm and Person Eﬀect
A more detailed description of the regression techniques is given by An-
drews, Schank, and Upward (2004):
For the spell-level ﬁxed eﬀect regression (Spell-FE), we deﬁne:
(E1)  s    i   ψj
for each unique worker-ﬁrm combination (  spell). Neither  i nor ψj vary
within a spell. The wage regression is then
(E2) yit   xit  wjt    ijt   εit,
with
(E3)    s  Σ    ijt.
n is the number of observations (worker years) within a speciﬁc spell.
Computing the mean deviations for each observation within a spell is:
(E4) yit   y  s   (xit   x  s)  (wjt   w  s)  ( ijt     s)   (εit   ε  s).
Because of (E3),    s –  ijt   0. The estimator is consistent because he
sweeps out both unobserved heterogeneities. He is not the most eﬃcient
one (because a least square dummy variable regression, LSDV, is).
The time-invariant covariates are constant within a spell and, therefore,
swept out. The following example for a standard one-way-ﬁxed model with
worker data only shows how the wage eﬀect of the time-invariant covari-
ates are identiﬁed. The one-way wage regression is:
(E5) yit    xit    i   εit.
The standard ﬁxed eﬀect (FE) estimator of  can be interpreted as an in-
strumented variable (IV) estimator (Andrews, Schank, and Upward 2004,
10; Verbeek 2004, section 10.2.5). Then we can formulate
 ijt  
n
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FE   [ΣiΣt (Xit   x  i) (Xit   x  i)] 1ΣiΣt (Xit   x  i) (Yit   y  i)
  [ΣiΣt(Xit   x  i) xit] 1ΣiΣt (Xit   x  i) Vit.
Further details for the Spell-FE regression can be found in Andrews,
Schank, and Upward (2004, 10–11). All variables correlated with the un-
observables are instrumented by their mean deviations. Time-invariant
variables are “instrumented with themselves,” making the usual random
eﬀect assumption. The estimator is a special case of Hausman and Taylors’
1981 estimator.
For explicitly calculating (and not sweeping out) the unobserved ﬁxed
eﬀects, we set all ﬁrm eﬀects with less than sixteen movers into a single
common eﬀect. This allows us to connect all groups (forty-ﬁve) into one by
constructing an artiﬁcial ﬁrm that contains all ﬁrms (and workers) who ex-
perience little turnover. After this procedure, we time-demean the remain-
ing ﬁrm dummies (this is what Andrews, Schank, and Upward (2004) call
FEiLSDVj) and compute  i with the estimated values of ψj.
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Table 8G.1 Firm is covered by collective contract compared to ﬁrms without
collective contract—average treatment eﬀects on the treated
1993 1995 2000
Average wage
Collective contract 2,704.07 2,744.75 2,838.53
Without col. contract 2,656.02 2,736.61 2,711.09
Average treatment eﬀects 48.05 8.13 127.44
t-value 0.64 0.08 2.33
Within ﬁrm standard deviation
Collective contract 772.90 804.97 831.06
Without col. contract 807.61 825.87 815.63
Average treatment eﬀects –34.71 –20.89 15.42
t-value –1.16 –0.6 0.7
Change in wage
Collective contract 19.56 93.71 54.18
Without col. contract 12.73 88.85 60.42
Average treatment eﬀects 6.82 4.86 –6.24
t-value 0.56 0.24 0.72
Coeﬃcient of variation of change in wage
Collective contract 0.289 0.297 0.294
Without col. contract 0.312 0.307 0.308
Average treatment eﬀects –0.2288 –0.0099 –0.0139
t-value –2.47 –0.71 –1.73References
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Exit rate
Collective contract 0.181 0.170 0.210
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Entry rate
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Average treatment eﬀects 0.087 0.086 0.027
t-value 3.49 2.08 0.95
Source: LIAB, cross-sectional model, version 1.
Notes: Firms with at least twenty-ﬁve full-time employees. In 1993, there are 120 (1995: 91;
2000: 193) ﬁrms without collective agreement in the sample, whereas ﬁrms with collective
contract are ten times more. We reverse, therefore, the treatment in the matching procedure.
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